Post by SkrynklighPungh on Sept 3, 2003 20:33:31 GMT 1
2003-09-03
Pressmeddelande
Nobelpristagare stöder nej-sidan
I en artikel i The Guardian skriver Joseph Stiglitz nobelpristagare i
ekonomi om det vettiga i att rösta nej till EMU i Sverige. Stiglitz
menar att ett medlemskap sannolikt kommer sänka tillväxten och öka
arbetslösheten.
- So the UK and Sweden are right in questioning whether it will deliver
better growth. Indeed, there is every reason to believe the contrary -
that it will lead to slower growth and higher unemployment, skriver
Stiglitz. For economies with a strong track record, such as Sweden and
the UK, joining the euro offers little to gain and much to lose,
- Det här visar tydligt hur lite ja-sidan har på fötterna när de spår en
fantastisk tillväxt och mindre arbetslöshet vid ett medlemskap. Istället
är det mycket som talar för att det blir precis tvärtom. Verkligheten
till exempel, kommenterar Jonas Sjöstedt (v).
- Stiglitz konstaterar också helt riktigt att stabilitetspakten inte
fungerar och med stor säkerhet kommer att ersättas. Frågan är bara med
vad? Det verkar mer och mer sannolikt att den ekonomiska krisen i EMU-
området och problemen med stabilitetspakten bereder vägen för en
gemensam skattepolitik vilket vore ödesdigert för den svenska välfärden,
avslutar Sjöstedt.
För mer information kontakta
Jonas Sjöstedt: 070-554 15 21
Se även den bifogade artikeln av Joseph Stiglitz
Article:
The euro has failed its first test Swedes may vote no to the single
currency - and with good reason
Joseph Stiglitz
Tuesday September 2, 2003
The Guardian
On September 14, Swedish voters will vote on joining the euro. A
majority appear likely to vote no - a mystery to the euro's advocates.
Isn't it a success, as marked by the currency's strength against the
dollar?
No one doubted that the euro would be accepted as a currency – in
economists' jargon, that it would become an important "medium of
exchange". But currencies are not ends in themselves; they are means -
to stronger, more stable growth. Judged on these terms, the best that
can be said for the euro is that the jury remains out; the worst, that
it has failed its first test.
Growth in euroland since the euro's introduction four-and-a-half years
ago has been dismal; yet the euro was supposed to enhance growth by
lowering interest rates and stimulating investment - something achieved
in only a few countries.
So the UK and Sweden are right in questioning whether it will deliver
better growth. Indeed, there is every reason to believe the contrary -
that it will lead to slower growth and higher unemployment.
Of course, the euro alone is not to be blamed for slow growth. The weak
global economy, including moribund America, is part of the problem. But
a good monetary system should protect an economy.
Before the euro was introduced, Eurosceptics worried that in focusing on
Europe's core (Germany and France), the periphery would be
disadvantaged. For example, if growth in the centre were strong but
smaller countries were showing weaknesses, monetary policy would follow
the centre's needs.
Few anticipated how events turned out: institutional rigidity prevented
the European Central Bank (ECB) from responding to weaknesses in
Europe's most important economy, Germany. Combined with the stability
pact - another case of institutional rigidity that prevents effective
use of fiscal policy – this has sent Europe into a major slowdown, if
not a recession.
Confidence in the euro, along with mounting evidence of America's
economic mismanagement, offered an opportunity for Europe to lower
interest rates to stimulate growth. But by focusing on inflation, the
ECB made Europe lose twice: both the lost investment that lower interest
rates might have prompted, and the loss of exports and increase in
imports that are sure to follow the euro's higher exchange rate.
Supporters of the euro point to the success of the US, with its single
currency. But America's institutional structure differs markedly from
Europe's. Labour mobility is an important part of the adjustment
mechanism in the US.
In the early and mid-1990s, when cutbacks in defence expenditure led to
unemployment rates of over 10% in California, many Californians migrated
to find work. Moreover, the federal government could boost California's
economy by redirecting expenditure to that state.
While labour mobility in Europe has grown, language and cultural
barriers mean that it is far lower than in the US. And besides the
common agricultural policy, expenditures at the European level are
meagre.
Finally, America has steadfastly refused to tie its hands in the way
that Europe has. A balanced budget amendment to the US constitution was
rejected, as were attempts to change the Federal Reserve's charter,
which mandates that it focus on employment and growth as well as
inflation.
Exchange-rate markets can be volatile, and this uncertainty translates
into higher effective borrowing costs. But such risks are far less
important for countries with sound economic management and low levels of
indebtedness. It is not destabilising speculation that poses the biggest
threat to Sweden today, but rather poor monetary management - including
an excessive focus on inflation in the manner of the ECB.
For economies with a strong track record, such as Sweden and the UK,
joining the euro offers little to gain and much to lose. Today, the
stability pact appears frayed. Economies such as those of Germany and
France extract forbearance when they breach the pact's deficit ceiling.
But small countries do not. The ECB would be unlikely to allow Sweden
the wiggle room granted its larger neighbours.
Euro membership may become more attractive. The institutional framework
may improve, or capital markets may become more volatile, making
exchange-rate risks intolerable. But matters within euroland may also
worsen. The stability pact, with its de facto separate rules for large
and small countries, will almost certainly be replaced. But with what?
Uncertainty about economic policy may lead to higher than necessary
interest rates in euroland - and slower growth. Britain's decision to
postpone euro membership makes sense. Swedes seem
likely to agree.
· Joseph Stiglitz, professor of economics at Columbia University, is a
Nobel prize winner and author of Globalization and Its Discontents.
Pressmeddelande
Nobelpristagare stöder nej-sidan
I en artikel i The Guardian skriver Joseph Stiglitz nobelpristagare i
ekonomi om det vettiga i att rösta nej till EMU i Sverige. Stiglitz
menar att ett medlemskap sannolikt kommer sänka tillväxten och öka
arbetslösheten.
- So the UK and Sweden are right in questioning whether it will deliver
better growth. Indeed, there is every reason to believe the contrary -
that it will lead to slower growth and higher unemployment, skriver
Stiglitz. For economies with a strong track record, such as Sweden and
the UK, joining the euro offers little to gain and much to lose,
- Det här visar tydligt hur lite ja-sidan har på fötterna när de spår en
fantastisk tillväxt och mindre arbetslöshet vid ett medlemskap. Istället
är det mycket som talar för att det blir precis tvärtom. Verkligheten
till exempel, kommenterar Jonas Sjöstedt (v).
- Stiglitz konstaterar också helt riktigt att stabilitetspakten inte
fungerar och med stor säkerhet kommer att ersättas. Frågan är bara med
vad? Det verkar mer och mer sannolikt att den ekonomiska krisen i EMU-
området och problemen med stabilitetspakten bereder vägen för en
gemensam skattepolitik vilket vore ödesdigert för den svenska välfärden,
avslutar Sjöstedt.
För mer information kontakta
Jonas Sjöstedt: 070-554 15 21
Se även den bifogade artikeln av Joseph Stiglitz
Article:
The euro has failed its first test Swedes may vote no to the single
currency - and with good reason
Joseph Stiglitz
Tuesday September 2, 2003
The Guardian
On September 14, Swedish voters will vote on joining the euro. A
majority appear likely to vote no - a mystery to the euro's advocates.
Isn't it a success, as marked by the currency's strength against the
dollar?
No one doubted that the euro would be accepted as a currency – in
economists' jargon, that it would become an important "medium of
exchange". But currencies are not ends in themselves; they are means -
to stronger, more stable growth. Judged on these terms, the best that
can be said for the euro is that the jury remains out; the worst, that
it has failed its first test.
Growth in euroland since the euro's introduction four-and-a-half years
ago has been dismal; yet the euro was supposed to enhance growth by
lowering interest rates and stimulating investment - something achieved
in only a few countries.
So the UK and Sweden are right in questioning whether it will deliver
better growth. Indeed, there is every reason to believe the contrary -
that it will lead to slower growth and higher unemployment.
Of course, the euro alone is not to be blamed for slow growth. The weak
global economy, including moribund America, is part of the problem. But
a good monetary system should protect an economy.
Before the euro was introduced, Eurosceptics worried that in focusing on
Europe's core (Germany and France), the periphery would be
disadvantaged. For example, if growth in the centre were strong but
smaller countries were showing weaknesses, monetary policy would follow
the centre's needs.
Few anticipated how events turned out: institutional rigidity prevented
the European Central Bank (ECB) from responding to weaknesses in
Europe's most important economy, Germany. Combined with the stability
pact - another case of institutional rigidity that prevents effective
use of fiscal policy – this has sent Europe into a major slowdown, if
not a recession.
Confidence in the euro, along with mounting evidence of America's
economic mismanagement, offered an opportunity for Europe to lower
interest rates to stimulate growth. But by focusing on inflation, the
ECB made Europe lose twice: both the lost investment that lower interest
rates might have prompted, and the loss of exports and increase in
imports that are sure to follow the euro's higher exchange rate.
Supporters of the euro point to the success of the US, with its single
currency. But America's institutional structure differs markedly from
Europe's. Labour mobility is an important part of the adjustment
mechanism in the US.
In the early and mid-1990s, when cutbacks in defence expenditure led to
unemployment rates of over 10% in California, many Californians migrated
to find work. Moreover, the federal government could boost California's
economy by redirecting expenditure to that state.
While labour mobility in Europe has grown, language and cultural
barriers mean that it is far lower than in the US. And besides the
common agricultural policy, expenditures at the European level are
meagre.
Finally, America has steadfastly refused to tie its hands in the way
that Europe has. A balanced budget amendment to the US constitution was
rejected, as were attempts to change the Federal Reserve's charter,
which mandates that it focus on employment and growth as well as
inflation.
Exchange-rate markets can be volatile, and this uncertainty translates
into higher effective borrowing costs. But such risks are far less
important for countries with sound economic management and low levels of
indebtedness. It is not destabilising speculation that poses the biggest
threat to Sweden today, but rather poor monetary management - including
an excessive focus on inflation in the manner of the ECB.
For economies with a strong track record, such as Sweden and the UK,
joining the euro offers little to gain and much to lose. Today, the
stability pact appears frayed. Economies such as those of Germany and
France extract forbearance when they breach the pact's deficit ceiling.
But small countries do not. The ECB would be unlikely to allow Sweden
the wiggle room granted its larger neighbours.
Euro membership may become more attractive. The institutional framework
may improve, or capital markets may become more volatile, making
exchange-rate risks intolerable. But matters within euroland may also
worsen. The stability pact, with its de facto separate rules for large
and small countries, will almost certainly be replaced. But with what?
Uncertainty about economic policy may lead to higher than necessary
interest rates in euroland - and slower growth. Britain's decision to
postpone euro membership makes sense. Swedes seem
likely to agree.
· Joseph Stiglitz, professor of economics at Columbia University, is a
Nobel prize winner and author of Globalization and Its Discontents.
